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NGO Visions of Development in 
the Changing Contexts of 
Ethiopia: 1960s-2015 
Aychegrew Hadera Hailu 
Abstract 
Since the early 1960s, many Non-Governmental Organizations (from now on NGOs) in Ethiopia, 
as in other parts of the Third World, have aspired to alleviate poverty. Others have envisaged a 
situation where communities enjoy the full spectrum of human rights. These visions of 
development are not too distant from those of various forms of government in Ethiopia during 
this period, although official discourses on human rights are only a recent phenomenon. However, 
there have always been clear differences between governmental actors and NGOs on the one hand, 
and between different NGOs among themselves, on the other, with regard to their strategic 
preferences on how to achieve development. The paper traces visions as well as strategies of NGOs 
in their changing historical contexts, shaped by dominant actors such as the state. It investigates 
the divergence and convergence of visions between various actors over time as well as the 
strategic shifts resulting from changes in the context. Thus, the paper’s contribution lies in its 
approach to treat development visions in a more inclusive way. The paper is concerned not only 
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with the in/capacity of NGO to formulate development visions, but also the willingness and 
commitment of state actors to allow a degree of public space for NGO operation. The study uses 
data generated from various oral and written primary and secondary sources collected by the 
contributor during two rounds of fieldwork in Ethiopia. 
1 Defining development and NGOs 
Development has always been a contested term. It is used by its advocates to mean positive 
progress, organic growth and evolution (Lewis / Kanji 2009: 49). The same advocates also argue 
that development refers to a process of making a better life for everyone (Peet / Hartwick 2009: 
1). A better life means meeting basic needs: namely sufficient food to maintain good health, a safe, 
healthy place in which to live, affordable services available to everyone and being treated with 
dignity and respect (Ibid.: 1). 
Development in the sense of making life better for everyone is a powerful ideal in that it has the 
power to drive people to change. However, there are broad disagreements on how to make life 
better for everyone (Ibid.: 1). The main reason is that various strategies exist which aim to achieve 
a better life for everyone (Sahleyesus 2005: 3). In the Ethiopian context in which this research 
was conducted, for instance, there have always been clear differences between governmental 
actors and NGOs on the one hand, and between different NGOs among themselves, on the other, 
with regard to their strategic preferences on how to realize the vision of making a better life for 
everyone. This is the case although NGO and state agreed on the purpose and end of development; 
many NGOs and governments in Ethiopia have aspired for the alleviation of poverty since the early 
1960s. 
Thus, it is clear that limiting scholarly debates to the end and purpose of development would 
ignore processes that may influence this end and purpose of development. A variety of actors may 
be involved in these processes. These actors are different not only in terms of strategies as shown 
earlier, but also in terms of interests that drive them, ideas, ideologies that they adhere to, values 
that they uphold etc. Hence, all these dynamics need to be considered to capture the fundamentals 
of development. This study uses development in the sense used by Kate Crehan and Achim von 
Oppen who define development as an arena where actors of differing strategies, interests, 
ideologies, ideas and values interface (Crehan / von Oppen 1994: 259-260). These actors may 
either cooperate or compete, dictated by these strategies, interests, ideologies, ideas and values 
(Ibid.: 47). Examining these set of dynamics challenges the literature that view development as a 
linear flow of ideas, programs and discourse. Viewing development as a linear flow of ideas, 
programs and discourse is proved to be flawed. Based on their research conducted in Zambia, 
Crehan and von Oppen correctly argue that we can come closer to the understanding of the vitality 
and political economy of development undertakings only when the complex web of meanings 
which various actors attach to programs and their competing strategies are brought into a 
coherent and holistic analysis (Ibid.: 259-260). 
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NGOs are actors in the arena. Objectives that justify operation of NGOs depend on their emergence 
in an area. Generally, NGOs that emerged prior to the Second World War, intended to relieve the 
suffering of victims of crisis namely wars, natural and manmade disasters etc. Since 1960s, NGOs 
have been drawn into discourses as to how to improve the lives of poor people in the Third World. 
These debates either generated new NGOs to improve the lives of the poor people or changed 
NGOs from mere humanitarian agencies to organizations with an objective to improve the lives of 
poor people (Teka 2000: 14). Considering this change, this paper also takes development to mean 
a conscious effort of organizations to ameliorate the plight of the poor and improve their living 
standards. 
Although they assist the poor people to improve their living standards, the concept of NGOs has 
triggered debates among scholars. This is mainly due to the diversity that exists between NGOs in 
terms of purpose, interests and ideologies (Ibid.: 5). Scholars have defined NGOs in line with two 
major approaches. The first approach assumes that there exist two power groups in any society, 
namely governmental and non-governmental organizations. Thus, any organization that exists 
outside of the government could be referred to as a non-governmental organization. For instance, 
Mario Padron has defined NGOs as all organizations located outside the state’s domain and the 
structure of government (Padron in Berhanu 2002: 120). 
However, the above definition still failed to clarify what NGOs are. This is because the universe of 
non-governmental activities is wide, large and all-inclusive. In fact, any form of relationship that 
exists outside of the state could be called a non-governmental activity. The concept of the third 
sector makes it easier to understand NGOs. Third sector defines NGOs as distinct not only from the 
state, but also from businesses and corporations whose major orientations and activities are 
predicated on profit motives (Berhanu 2002: 120). However, NGOs as a third sector still does not 
tell us what NGOs are. The third sector includes a variety of organizations and it is vital to identify 
these organizations and pinpoint features that distinguish NGOs from these organizations. 
Dessalegn Rahmeto summarizes four broad groups of organizations that form civil society in 
Ethiopia. These are 1) NGOs 2) advocacy organizations (rights-based institutions, institutions 
committed to the protection of the environment, wildlife, etc., 3) interest group institutions 
(professional societies, trade unions, cooperatives, chambers of commerce, employers 
associations) and 4) cultural societies (including community organizations) (Rahmeto 2002: 
106). 
Some features make NGOs unique from organizations listed above. This uniqueness lies in the 
type of beneficiaries. Michaela Van Freyold says rightly that NGOs are “[…] those organizations 
whose goods and services are targeted at non-members”. This makes NGOs different from a 
number of other civil society organizations namely the interest group institutions mentioned 
above, self-help organizations (Van Freyold in Sahleyesus 2005: 3). 
As shown by Dessalegn, fields of action, such as that of human rights, can serve to distinguish 
NGOs from advocacy organizations. However, this is problematic for two reasons. To begin with, 
NGOs might also advocate non-organizational members’ interests (Neubert 1997:3). Secondly, 
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over the last few decades, NGOs in Ethiopia, as in many African countries, have shifted from 
delivering goods and services to acting as advocates for the public interest. This research has thus 
used the term NGOs in a way understood by Sarah Michael. In her study of NGOs in Africa Sarah 
Michael states that NGOs are: 
Development actors existing apart from government and corporations, operating on 
non-profit or not for profit basis with an emphasis on voluntarism, and pursuing a 
mandate of providing development services, undertaking communal development 
work or advocating on development issues (Michael 2004: 3). 
Organizations that meet the above set of criteria are numerous. Scholars have attempted to 
facilitate the study of NGO by classifying them into groups. For instance, Bratton has classified 
NGOs according to size (big, medium, small); origin (national, international); behavior pattern 
(regime-conforming, regime-critical); central activity (relief/welfare, development); and 
orientation (secular, ecumenical). In this study, a distinction is made whenever necessary 
between NGOs of different origins, specifically between national and international NGOs and 
between religious and secular NGOs. 
2 Theoretical Perspective 
The past few decades have witnessed a dramatic growth in the number and scope of NGOs around 
the world (Lewis 2001: 1). The prominence accorded to NGOs has triggered debates about their 
efficiency and effectiveness with regard to tackling the challenges of development. Extensive 
research on the role of NGOs in development and emergency work in a variety of geographical 
context has emerged (Ibid.: 30; Lewis / Opoku-Mensah 2006: 669). 
NGO research has, however, exhibited key limitations. Firstly, an over-emphasis was put on 
organizational case studies and some of these studies are rich in detail, but lack contextualization. 
Secondly, there has been a relatively weak theorization of the NGO phenomenon (Lewis / Opoku-
Mensah 2006: 669). A closer look into these works shows an orientation towards implementation 
theory and some of the questions these works attempt to address include: what type of support, 
what type of project and what type of implementing agency would achieve a particular result 
(Neubert: 3). Neubert called this the “limitation of perspectives in development policy” (Ibid.: 53). 
Decontextualization and weak theorization mentioned above undoubtedly originated from a 
conceptual problem that results from the perspectives of researchers. NGOs are considered as a 
“magic bullet” for poverty reduction in Third World countries (Lewis 2001: 1). This conception 
wrongly assumes that NGOs are not only separate from but also in opposition to the state. This is 
because what is inherent in NGOs and the state is considered to be different. While NGOs, it is 
believed, tend towards democracy, the state in Third World countries mainly in Africa is believed 
to be always prone to despotism (Rahmeto 2002: 103). The perspective that portrays NGOs as 
separate from the state is informed by liberal oppositional theoretical approach that takes NGO 
as “[…] a realm outside and in opposition to the state” (Ku 2002: 534). Assuming that the state is 
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inevitably coercive and oppressive, this theory favors a highly autonomous civil sphere outside 
the state. It advocates the self-management of the sphere, through self-help bodies, informal 
networks and social movement s (Ibid.: 534). 
One of the major limitations of the liberal oppositional theory is that it fails to consider the 
influences of the state. NGOs are not immune from the influences of state. In his useful insight 
about the influence of the state on NGOs, Jeffery Clark tells us that “NGOs can oppose, complement 
or reform the state but they can’t ignore it” (Clark in Lewis / Kanji 2009: 4). Other scholars like 
Alan Fowler support Clark’s assertion. Alan Fowler argues that NGOs are not “closed systems” 
with clear boundaries around them, but are part of “open systems”, which makes them highly 
dependent on events and resources in the environment and cannot be viewed in isolation from 
what goes on around them (Fowler in Lewis 2001: 140). Thus, the success of NGOs depends not 
just on their organizational qualities, but also on their “[…] ability to influence its environment 
and appreciate outside forces correctly” (Lewis 2001: 140). Scholars have since long called for a 
deeper analysis about NGOs’ attempts to deal with their environment including the state. David 
Lewis and Paul Opoku-Mensah argued emphatically that: 
Rather than emphasizing only the “heroic” dimensions of NGO activities, in which they 
are seen only as principled moral and political actors opening up spaces for new 
voices and ideas, a more multidimensional analysis of relations of power and 
negotiation will […] produce a far more convincing account of NGO relations with 
states and donors (Lewis / Opoku-Mensah 2006: 672). 
All NGOs operate within a contextual matrix derived from specific locational and historical 
circumstances that change over time (Lewis 2001: 43). NGOs are often intimately connected with 
their home governments in relationships that are ambivalent and dynamic, sometimes 
cooperative, sometimes contentious, sometimes both simultaneously (Fisher 1997: 451). Under 
any of these circumstances, NGOs generally depend on the type of government that they deal with 
for room for maneuver to ensure their organizational survival and achieve the objectives for 
which they exist (Lewis 2001: 33). 
Due to changes taking place within NGOs and as a result of the shifting character of NGO-state 
relation, it is quite helpful to subscribe to the analytical principles offered by a variety of social 
theories some of which are the liberal relational approach, theory of political opportunity 
structures and actor oriented theoretical perspective. The merit of the liberal relational approach 
is that it considers civil society as being necessarily engaged with the state. It also argues that civil 
society effectively defends itself against an encroaching government only through legal and 
political institutions (Ku 2002: 534). However, the last argument has a limitation as it assumes 
that state allows legal and political institutions to truly function. In many post-colonial African 
states, legal and political institutions operate as mechanisms to ensure the entrenchment of state 
interests (Hashmi 2006: 57). 
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However, the limitations of the liberal relational theory could be overcome by an actor-oriented 
theoretical perspective and political opportunity structures. Power is central in any form of 
relation between social actors. Thus, power relation between NGOs and the state is a central 
theme. States that were highly centralized in post-colonial Africa were not conducive to the 
operation of NGOs (Ibid.: 57). However, NGOs still depended on their skills for room for maneuver 
even in a difficult environment. The actor-oriented theory of Norman Long can explain the way 
social actors such as NGOs operate even in an oppressive context. Norman Long asserted that all 
forms of intervention are influenced by actors and their structures (Long 2001: 13). The theory 
he developed also delivered useful concepts to explain relationships between actors. One of these 
is agency. Agency attributes to each actor “knowledgeability” and “capability” to attempt to solve 
problems, learn how to intervene in the flow of social events around them, and, to a degree, 
monitor their own actions, observing how others react to their behaviors and taking note of the 
various contingent circumstances (Ibid.: 13). 
NGO agency is a dynamic process in that it is created, transferred and lost depending on the 
contexts in which NGOs operate (Ibid.: 13). The theory of political opportunity structures 
complements the actor-oriented theory. Concepts of the former are part of the resource 
mobilization theories used to analyze certain movements. The theory of political opportunity puts 
its arguments on an assumption that aspects within a political milieu determine the rise of 
strategies exercised by civil societies in engaging the state as well as the outcomes of the 
engagement(Lopez / Tadem 2006: 38). Broader political systems that structure opportunities for 
collective action are the focus of this theory. While it does not ignore the dynamics within an 
organization, it rather points to the importance of movements to create and mobilize resources at 
their disposal to advance their agenda. The concept of political opportunity structures is, thus, 
deployed to explain how a specific political environment determines the outcome of the actions 
of civil society actors in each of respective sectors of the study and how these actors are also able 
to take advantage of opportunities that are external to them (Ibid.: 38). 
3 Origins of NGOs in Ethiopia 
Compared with the long history of the country, the emergence of NGOs in Ethiopia is a recent 
phenomenon, going back to the first quarter of the 20th century. However, humanitarian practice 
goes as far back as the introduction of Christianity. As is the case elsewhere, and especially in 
Africa, churches and missions pioneered humanitarian work. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has 
been assisting poor people since its inception in the 4th century (Alvares 1961a: 541; 1961b: 224-
226). The poor people who asked for the support of the national church and later from individuals 
and organizations were those who found it difficult to meet their basic necessities of life. Thus, 
"the poor” is used in this paper to mean people who lack their daily meal, clothing, shelter to 
protect them, and who seek some help and spiritual consolation to be self-reliant, those whose 
desire is not satisfied at all and see life as gloomy (Demessie 1967: 3). 
As the number of people of the kind described above increased in the 1970s, the Church’s 
humanitarian activities took a more formal character. Concerned by the looming famine of the 
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1970s, the Church set up an NGO called Development and Interchurch Aid Commission (DIDAC) 
in 1972. As an NGO that secures funds from the church and foreign donors, DIDAC has focused on 
integrated rural development, food production, reforestation, water and health (Clark 2000: 9). 
Similarly, Jesuits took the credit in initiating the earliest Western education in the country in the 
16th century (Sahleyesus 2005: 85). However, this effort was not sustained due to the rebellion 
against the conversion of the monarch, Susenyos (1607-1632) to Catholicism. As a result, the 
monarch resigned, transferring his power to his son, Fasiledes in 1632. The new monarch expelled 
foreigners from the country, marking the beginning of Ethiopia’s “closed-door policy” (Abir 2006: 
225). The country opened its door to foreign influences in the 19th century when both Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries, who went to the country in large numbers, started running welfare, 
education, health, community development along with their main agenda, evangelization 
(Berhanu 2002: 121). 
A new generation of national NGOs emerged in the first quarter of the 20th century. Members of 
the ruling class who had exposure to the outside world set up NGOs. An important historical factor 
for this was the threat that Italy posed to the Ethiopian sovereignty. A group of political elites, 
worried by the Italian invasion, formed the Ethiopian Red Cross Society on 8 July 1935 to relieve 
victims of the anticipated war (The Ethiopian Red Cross Society: 14). In same way, women 
members of the royal family set up two more NGOs: the Ethiopian Women’s Welfare Association 
(Pankhurst 1960: 45) and the Ethiopian Women’s Association for Good Work Service (The Prime 
Minister’s Office 2001: 131). Due to their close affiliation to the power center, the leadership of 
these organizations enjoyed the patronage of the imperial regime. However, the imperial 
government sometimes took measures that transgressed the autonomy of NGOs. This had to do 
with the competition for resources. A case in point is that the Ethiopian Women’s Welfare 
Association initiated a lottery system which gave the Association a significant income, until the 
government decided to expropriate it. The Association protested, however, the government 
remained adamant. The government eventually decided that the Association would get only Eth $ 
50,000 every year from the Ministry of Finance (Ibid.: 12). 
After 25 years, what could be described as development-oriented NGOs emerged. They are a 
group of organizations that intended not only to relieve victims of crisis but also to uplift the living 
standards of poor people. They believed that poverty was a complex phenomenon. However, they 
were of the opinion that poverty could be overcome by deploying material inputs and expertise. 
Development-oriented NGOs, thus, refers to a group of NGOs who believed that poverty in a 
specific locality could be conquered through mobilization of human and material resources. This 
idea emerged in Ethiopia with the rise of a professional middle class. The rise of a professional 
class itself had to do with education that expanded significantly in the mid twentieth century. 
Graduates of high school and university noted that neither the government nor self–help systems 
could address poverty in the country. Thus, national NGOs began to help fill the perceived void 
(Clark 2000: 4). These NGOs were of two types. The first were philanthropic NGOs. Philanthropic 
NGOs were driven by an ethical notion of charity intended to promote the welfare of poor people 
(Lewis / Kanji 2009: 30). With a view to promoting the welfare of poor people, philanthropic NGOs 
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usually ran a variety of programs including relief. The second type of NGOs could be called single 
issue development NGOs. Unlike philanthropic NGOs, single issue development NGOs run a 
selected program intended to address poverty in Ethiopia. The monarch himself pioneered the 
effort to set up philanthropic organization. In 1955, he set up the Haile Selassie I Foundation to 
set an example so that other well-to-do citizens would take it as a model (Jenbere 1959: 98). 
Emerging urban-based middle class, namely teachers, civil servants, military officers and their 
spouses, politicians and artists, modeled their organizations up on that of the Haile Selassie I 
Foundation (Sahleyesus 2005: 88-89). Single issue NGOs included the Family Guidance 
Association of Ethiopia (FGAE) and Agri-Service Ethiopia both of which were set up in 1969 (Ibid.: 
89). 
The two famines that occurred in 1973-74 and 1983-84 attracted international NGOs in large 
numbers. When famine broke out in 1973-74, eleven international NGOs based either on 
Protestant or Catholic faith was operative in Ethiopia. The Catholic Relief Service and Concern 
were among the most prominent organizations driven by the Catholic faith. Similarly, Lutheran 
World Federation, the American Presbyterian Mission, and World Vision were typical examples 
of protestant-based NGOs prominent during the 1973-74 famine (Rahmeto 2002: 106). During 
the 1983-84 famine, the number of international NGOs doubled. A new development during this 
time was that secular NGOs dominated the institutional landscape in Ethiopia over faith-based 
NGOs. Only a handful of secular NGOs had been involved to relieve victims of the 1970s famine. 
Due to the widespread publicity that the media carried out on behalf of famine victims, a number 
of secular NGOs opened field offices in Ethiopia (Ibid.: 106). Impressed by the number of NGOs 
that he saw, Kurt Janson, the United Nations Assistant Secretary General for Emergency 
Operations in Ethiopia, remarked that “[…] for a Marxist government to permit so many Western 
NGOs to function in all parts of the country was highly unusual” (Janson in Teka 2000: 232). The 
emergence of international NGOs influenced national NGOs in two ways. To begin with, 
international NGOs preferred funding national NGOs to running programs of their own. This was 
particularly true during the 1970s. Thus, Oxfam used to fund the Christian Relief Fund (CRF). 
Similarly, the Catholic Relief Service from the United States and Concern from Ireland were 
funding the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat. Another example was that the Lutheran World 
Federation and World Vision used to fund the Ethiopian Evangelical Church MekanuYesus. The 
trend to fund national NGOs undoubtedly increased their profile and visibility. International NGOs 
also influenced Ethiopians to take the initiative to set up NGOs to deal with famines. Ethiopians 
who were shocked by the two famines modeled their NGOs on international NGOs. The earliest of 
these was the Haile Selassie I University Famine Relief Committee that was set up in 1973 by 
faculty members of Haile Selassie I University (Beyene 1988: 4). Other Ethiopians in private 
business and civil service also set up NGOs of one kind or another to deal with the recurrence of 
disasters throughout 1980s (Sahleyesus 2005: 123). 
The relative liberalism that followed the collapse of the military government in May 1991 and the 
rise of donors’ support contributed to the fact that citizens again took the initiative to set up 
various forms of NGOs in the country (Ibid.: 123). While those NGOs set up earlier were still 
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operational, dealing with emergency situations that followed the fall of the military government, 
two new types of NGOs showed up in the 1990s. The first group was those that defend human and 
democratic rights. The earliest of these were inspired by vocal critique of the government and 
lawyers (Ibid.: 110). This group of NGOs was much more visible from the late 1990s due to donor 
mediation that came about as part of the liberalization process (Rahmeto 2008a: 97). The second 
group came into existence out of the concerns of the government. Concerned about the rise of 
human rights NGOs especially, the government set up pro-government NGOs. Firstly, ex-relief 
organizations of rebel movements were promoted into NGOs (Vaux 1991: 2). Secondly, the 
government created ethnic-based development associations in different parts of the country 
(Ibid.: 97). 
To sum up, NGOs evolved in response to diverse influences within Ethiopia and outside of it. 
Groups of people with diverse backgrounds and motives played a key role in these evolutions. 
Religious groups with the motive to evangelize Ethiopians took the initiative to set up the earliest 
NGOs. Humanitarianism has also been the second most important factor for the formation of 
NGOs. This group of NGOs includes those NGOs set up by Ethiopians to deal with the anticipated 
disaster of the Italian invasion and the famines that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. The motive 
of a few individuals to democratize state institutions in the 1990s and state responses to this 
motivation resulted in two different types of NGOs. Firstly, citizens set up NGOs to lobby the 
government to respect human and democratic rights. The second type of NGOs were those NGOs 
which the government set up to counter the influence of the first group of NGOs. Seen from 
historical perspective, the various motives outlined above combined to shape NGOs that operated 
across the three forms of government in Ethiopia. 
The number of NGOs has been increasing rapidly in Ethiopia. Throughout the 1970s, about twenty 
five NGOs were operative, mostly in relief and rehabilitation (Ibid.: 106). The number doubled in 
response to the outbreak of the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 8). 
By the middle of the 1990s, the number of registered NGOs reached 350 (Rahmeto 2002: 106). 
Recent statistics produced by the Ethiopian Charity and Society Agency, an official body that 
oversees NGOs, shows that there are 2776 registered civil society organizations most of which are 
NGOs (Ethiopian Charity and Society Agency 2014: 1-14) . This exponential growth of NGOs was 
part of what is known in the literature as NGOization. NGOization refers to professionalization 
and institutionalization of social action (Choudry/Kapoor 2011: 3). This process has to do with 
the global neo-liberalism that gained an impetus following the end of the Cold War. Major western 
powers have since then argued that the road to democracy in developing countries especially in 
Africa lies in the active involvement of civil society (of which NGOs are part) in the political 
process (Rahmeto 2002: 106). Certainly, this process played an important role in increasing the 
number of NGOs as well as their influence in Africa, including in Ethiopia. However, it is wrong to 
associate NGO visibility with only global influence. The local context encouraged the rise of NGOs 
as well. In the Ethiopian context, the 1980s and 1990s is characterized by profound chaos. The 
ongoing war in the north not only weakened the national economy but also displaced people in 
large number who needed support. The end of the war with the defeat of the Ethiopian 
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government did not end this chaos. A number of Ethiopians who had depended on the military 
government - namely civil servants, members of the army and government officials - now 
demanded support for their survival. In order to deal with this demand, individuals or a group of 
individuals set up NGOs of various kinds (Personal interview with Mr. Mitiku: 2012, September 
10). 
The number of NGOs as well as the diversity that exists between them poses a major 
methodological challenge to their study. Therefore, it appears imperative to take a case study 
methodological perspective to deal with this challenge. To that end, Agri-Service Ethiopia (ASE), 
Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) and Oxfam GB (Oxfam) are 
selected. The selection is made on the basis of their development orientation in their operation 
across the three political regimes in Ethiopia namely the imperial, the military and the current 
ethnic-based regimes. Yet, it is difficult to say that the selected NGOs are all the same in origin and 
orientation. Oxfam GB, for instance, is foreign and ASE and CCRDA are national in origin. Likewise, 
Oxfam GB and ASE are secular and CCRDA combined both secular and religious dynamics in terms 
of orientation. It is, thus, vital to take note of the diverse attributes and their influences on the 
operation of the selected NGOs. To that purpose, a historical approach is preferred. A historical 
approach recognizes diverse attributes and draws attention to the influences of these diverse 
attributes on decisions that NGO leaders passed in response to changing contexts. There are two 
strategic issues to treat the diverse attributes as well as their influences. The first one has to do 
with a set of development ideals driving NGOs in a geographical context such as Ethiopia. The 
second issue that logically follows the first one is related to translations of these ideals into action. 
This paper, thus, aims to trace the origins of ideals of the selected NGOs as well as the way they 
translated these ideals into actions. In doing the last task, the paper gives due attention to contexts 
in which NGOs operated. Before doing this, we trace the origins of the selected NGOs. 
The origins of the NGOs studied in this project are traced both inside and outside Ethiopia due to 
diverse contexts in which they were formed. Two groups of actors played an active part in the 
formation of ASE. The first group was composed of expatriate teachers with Catholic backgrounds. 
Despite the fact that they were inspired by Christian values to help the poor, this group of 
individuals did not plan to put their initiative under the influence of the Catholic Church. The first 
project agreement signed on 1 June 1969 stipulated that the project would function 
autonomously, detached from the Catholic Church (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 13). There were 
two reasons for this. Firstly, the protagonists planned to serve all poor people regardless of their 
religious backgrounds (Akpak Studio 2000). Secondly, the actors had the desire to pursue their 
own development approach that emphasized utilization of the potential of project participants as 
a strategic direction. However, the founders of ASE saw that social evils such as superstition 
remained a major obstacle to tap into the potential of project participants (Ibid.). The founders of 
ASE were deeply concerned also by the overall perception of the rural people about their 
potential. The seriousness of the problem is well captured in one of the earliest sources that stated 
that “[…] experience shows us every day to what extent peasants underestimate themselves and 
easily take refuge in fatalism” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1975: 2). 
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The second group of persons who shared the observations of the founders of ASE about 
impediments to rural residents was politicians. They were part of a group of officials within the 
government that aspired for reform. Two officials played an active part in the process of the 
formation of ASE. The first one was Dejjazmach1 Girmachew Tekle Hawariat who was Minister of 
Agriculture. He was considered to be one of the most progressive officials of the imperial 
government. As a minister who was managing rural development effort in the country, 
Dejjazmach Girmachew invited development organizations from abroad to complement the 
efforts of the government. As part of this, he invited the Institut Africain pour le Développement 
Economique et Social - Centre Africain de Formation (hereafter INADES-Formation), a Catholic 
NGO to implement the educational program it had been running in Francophone Africa, in 1965. 
This had two major effects. Firstly, it facilitated the relation that the founders of ASE had launched 
with INADES-Formation. INADES-Formation influenced the founders of ASE on a number of 
issues. For instance, INADES-Formation increased the conviction of ASE’s founders that educating 
the rural residents about their potential was the only way to true development (Akpak Studio 
2000). Secondly, it eased the bureaucratic hurdle for ASE to get legal recognition. The reason for 
this was that the objective for which ASE stood was discussed and approved not only by officials 
of the Ministry of Agriculture but also by the monarch himself. In fact, the approval of the monarch 
could be considered as a seal that assured the organization the legal status. Concerning this, one 
of the founders of ASE himself said that ASE was established on “June 6, 1969 at the feet of H.M. 
Haile Selassie I” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 33). The approval of the monarch was formalized 
by the Ministry of Interior on 24 December 1969 when ASE was given a legal certificate (Agri-
Service Ethiopia n.d.-a: 1). The second official who played an active part in the establishment of 
ASE was Dejjazmach Wolde Semait, who was the governor of Wollaita province. Dejjazmach 
Wolde Semait was considered to be one of the progressive officials of the imperial government. 
Due to a variety of activities that he carried out, Dejjazmach Wolde Semait was called “The father 
of Wollaita development” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 33). Expansion of education was one of 
these activities. Dejjazmach Wolde Semait once built a school close to the Catholic school where 
Father Henry, one of the founders of ASE, was teaching. Father Henry felt that it was not fair to 
run two schools closely and he complained to Dejjazmach Wolde Semait. Dejjazmach Wolde 
Semait advised Father Henry to incorporate agricultural course to teach not only the youths but 
also the peasants. This shifted the career of Father Henry from a teacher at the school to a founder 
of ASE that came to stand for ”the social and economic advancement of the rural poor” (Agri-
Service Ethiopia 1989: 24). 
The cooperation government officials showed to the founders of ASE had broader explanation 
that can be traced back to the Italian occupation period i.e. 1935-1941. Following an attempt to 
assassinate Rodolfo Graziani in Ethiopia in 1937, the Italians decimated the educated class of 
Ethiopians. This was because colonial officials believed that educated Ethiopians conspired 
against Italian interests in the region. Also, the Italians coerced faith-based NGOs that had helped 
                                                             
1 A politico-military title of Ethiopia during the imperial regime that came to an end in 1974; its literal meaning is 
commander of the gate 
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educate those Ethiopians to leave the country on the ground that they had intervened in the 
political affairs of the country. The restored monarchy started, thus, pursuing a policy that 
encouraged NGOs of various origins to come and launch especially educational programs to satisfy 
the new demand (Alemneh 1970: 6). The encouragement gained momentum in the 1960s when 
the government that started the first planned development activities sought the assistance of 
NGOs. The policy the government followed resulted in the visibility of NGOs in Ethiopia, many of 
which had religious roots (Rahmeto 2009: 50-66). The famine that broke out in 1973-74 in 
Ethiopia brought those NGOs under the umbrella of the Consortium of Christian Relief and 
Development Association (CCRDA). The idea to create CCRDA can be traced to the civil war in 
Nigeria (1967-1970). When the Ethiopian famine broke out, one of the Catholic priests who had 
participated in a joint relief operation during the Nigerian civil war proposed that collective action 
of NGOs is to be put in place to effectively deal with the famine in Ethiopia. Father Kevin Doheny 
who proposed the idea to set up CCRDA described in his memoir that “for me, it [Christian Relief 
Fund, the precursor of CCRDA] was an outgrowth of the Biafran war. I would not have got the idea 
were it not for Biafra” (Doheny 1997: 100). 
The founders of CCRDA had come to Ethiopia basically to preach the Gospel of God. To that end, 
they used to offer limited social services such as education, health and some community 
development activities. Thus, like that of ASE, the founders of CCRDA were driven by Christian 
value. Describing the role of Christianity, one of the earliest publications of the Association tells 
us that “[CCRDA] is solidified by the basic Christian commitment to serve [the poor people]” 
(CRDA 1977: 1). However, the leadership of CCRDA intentionally kept at minimal the influence of 
religion. This was because the founders were divided over the interpretation of Christianity. This 
division among various denominations eclipsed all discussions held to establish CCRDA. Even 
after a consensus was reached to set up an association to coordinate the relief operation, a 
representative of the American Lutheran Mission rejected the idea. His justification was that the 
proposed CCRDA would be dominated by the Catholics and that it would undermine religious 
freedom of members (Beyene 1988: 4). The Ethiopian Orthodox Church had from the start 
rejected the idea of creating an all-inclusive consortium (Ibid.: 4). However, the leadership of 
CCRDA used Christianity to mobilize resources. In a memo he circulated on 9 October 1985, the 
chairman of the Association told members that “if we look at the roster of donors, they are church 
related organizations who see in CRDA [CCRDA] an ecumenical experiment that is working” 
(Gebre 1985: 3). It could, thus, be argued that though they were inspired by Christian value, 
representatives of 13 faith-based NGOs set up and sustained CCRDA to “relieve human suffering 
and improve the standard of living for the underprivileged people in Ethiopia” (CRDA 1977: 1). 
The food crisis that brought 13 faith-based NGOs under the umbrella of CCRDA appealed also to 
international NGOs to rush into Ethiopia and rescue famine victims. One of these was Oxfam GB. 
The origins of Oxfam GB go back to the Second World War. The Oxford Committee for Famine 
Relief (OCFR), the precursor of Oxfam GB, was set up by a handful of individuals including the 
Mayer of Oxford in October 1942 to rescue victims of the war in Greece (Black in Teka 2000: 10). 
From the early part of 1960s, Oxfam expanded the scope of its operation and took global mandate 
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(Ibid.: 24). Oxfam’s presence in Ethiopian goes back to the early 1960s and when the Ethiopian 
famine of 1973-74 reached its critical stage, the organization sent Toby Gooch to open an office in 
Ethiopia (Ibid.: 24). 
To sum up, NGOs studied in this project were set up by a relatively well-to-do class who were 
driven both by social and religious motives. In laying down the structures of NGOs, these 
protagonists did not fail to secure the cooperation of government officials. The cooperation that 
the founders of NGOs secured was due to post-Italian period policy of the imperial government. 
4 NGO Development Visions and State in Ethiopia 
NGOs might be able to formulate development visions. However, the translation of these visions 
into action has been negotiated by powerful actors. This is shown by drawing attention to three 
NGOs in Ethiopia. In the 20th century, Ethiopia has witnessed three types of political regimes with 
different ideals with which they acted to shape the society. NGOs themselves construed major 
events in the country and based on their interpretations, they either complemented the 
government or acted against it. These actions of the government and NGOs had its own influences 
on NGO visions. Donors also influenced the interactions between NGOs and governments. A study 
of a multi-level interactions between NGOs, governments and donors attests to the fact that NGO 
vision enjoyed opportune moment during the imperial time, were instrumentalized by the 
military government and revitalized during the relative liberalism from 1991 onwards. 
4.1 The Roots of NGO Visions and their Interplay with the Imperial Government 
NGOs in Ethiopia have articulated their visions since the 1960s. These visions focused on poverty 
alleviation until May 1991 when the military government came to an end. Following the end of 
the military dictatorship, NGOs have envisaged a situation where communities enjoy the full 
spectrum of human and democratic rights. Neither poverty alleviation nor the quest for human 
and democratic rights are too distant from those of governments in Ethiopia during this period, 
although official discourses on human rights are only a recent phenomenon. 
However, there have always been marked differences between governmental actors and NGOs on 
the one hand, and between different NGOs among themselves, on the other, with regard to their 
strategic preferences on how to achieve development. During the imperial period, NGOs acted 
autonomously2 in pursuing their visions. This, I argue, had a lot to do with the understanding that 
both NGOs and the government shared the ‘same’ vision. 
In a sharp contrast with dominant development model of the 1950s proposed by major donor 
organizations such as the World Bank, Swedish International Development Agency etc. that 
                                                             
2 During the imperial period, NGOs depended on their own effort to generate income and the influence of donors on 
NGOs’ autonomy was minimal 
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emphasized macro-economic growth, NGOs put the poor people to be their focus of development. 
The founders of ASE, for instance, identified constraints that, they believed, underdeveloped the 
rural residents. Although these constraints were diverse in type, superstition and ignorance 
remained the preoccupation of the founders of ASE. The founders of ASE were not only 
preoccupied by the nature of these constraints but also appalled by the fact that rural residents 
failed to take initiatives to improve their status. The last problem originated from the fact that 
rural residents underestimated their potential to change their socio-economic status (Agri-
Service Ethiopia 1975: 2). The founders of ASE, thus, concluded that rural residents would remain 
poor as long as they maintain the way they assess their potential (Ibid.: 2). 
Though they saw that the rural people were hit by poverty, the founders of ASE believed that rural 
residents have the potential to develop themselves. A text produced in 1975 attests to this. It 
states that “[…] no one can develop small farmers. It is up to the farmers to develop themselves. 
Other people and development organization can help them but in the final analysis it is the 
farmers themselves who are the agents of their own development” (Ibid.: 2). Premised on this, the 
founders of ASE envisioned an Ethiopia where rural peasants reached the stage of adultness, 
capable of negotiating with dominant actors (Personal interview with Mr. Assefa: 2012, October 
12). They believed that a human being reached adultness when he/she becomes fully conscious 
about himself/herself as well as the social, economic and political environment in which he/she 
lives. As a result, the organization put in place resources “[…] to help arouse in them a greater 
awareness of their dignity as human being” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1975: 2-3). To that end, ASE 
adopted correspondence education as a strategy (Personal interview with Mr. Worku: 2013, 
September 3; Personal interview with Mr. Assefa: 2012, October 12). 
ASE’s vision and its strategic preference can be traced to INADES-Formation. INADES-Formation 
believed that the rural people in the Third World have the potential to develop themselves and 
that rural education is the only way to true development (Personal interview with Mr. Worku: 
2013, September 3; Personal interview with Mr. Assefa: 2012, October 12). This again was 
originated from the global self-help development discourse that argued that people have the 
potential to develop themselves (Personal interview with Mr. Worku: 2013, September 3). There 
was, in fact, one major difference between ASE and INADES-Formation with regard to the role an 
organization would play in the process. While INADES-Formation tended to argue for the 
provision of technical information to project participants, ASE opted for an inclusive approach to 
assist the poor people. With regard to the differences, one of the sources states that “because we 
are not only concerned with do’s and don’ts [INADES-Formation] but also to achieve his [a 
peasant] fulfillment as a human being. Our is an integrated approach to life in all its complexity” 
(Agri-Service Ethiopia n.d.b: 1). 
Like that of ASE, Oxfam’s vision is traced to the global development discourse. It was, in fact, this 
discourse that transformed Oxfam from a mere humanitarian organization to an organization 
with a defined development vision. This shift took place in the early 1960s in response to the new 
debate that followed the “Decade of Development”. The debate resulted in a shift from elimination 
of economic bottlenecks to rapid industrialization to eradication of poverty through sustainable 
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livelihood, increased production and improving the standard of living in the Third World (Ibid.: 
116). Oxfam welcomed the shift of emphasis that now put poor people in developing countries 
center stage. Aware of this, Oxfam articulated its vision and included it in the new Memorandum 
of Association approved in 1965. According to the Memorandum, Oxfam stands: 
To relieve poverty, distress and suffering in any part of the world (including 
starvation, sickness or any physical disability or affliction) and primarily when arising 
from any public calamity (including famine, earthquake, pestilence, war or civil 
disturbance) or the immediate or continuing result of want natural or artificial 
resources, or the means to develop them, and whether acting alone or in association 
with others (Oxfam 1965: 15) 
Unlike ASE and Oxfam whose visions are traced to discourses that involved self-help development 
and poverty alleviation respectively, the founders of CCRDA articulated their vision in the midst 
of the food crisis that threatened the whole nation. The founders of CCRDA observed the famine 
situation in Wollo and Tigray. As described earlier, theological differences undermined initially 
the discussion to set up CCRDA (Doheny 1997: 99). Some representatives of NGOs even said that 
they came to Ethiopia to preach the Gospel of God, not to feed the hungry (Beyene 1991: 97-100). 
Those who showed the willingness came together not only to relieve victims of the 1970s famine 
but to work together towards the alleviation of suffering. Thus, the founders embraced a “[…] 
collective vision of improving the plight of the poor in Ethiopia through the willingness of working 
together” (CRDA 1997: 1). 
The NGO visions I have been examining contained a potential conflict with the government. ASE’s 
aspiration for an empowered rural people having the agency at their disposal to negotiate with 
the government assumed the existence of a power imbalance between the rulers and the ruled. 
The vision called to redressing this. Similarly, Oxfam believed that, manipulated by power holders, 
structures of any sorts underdeveloped the peasantry. Because of this, the structures were either 
to be bypassed or reformed and new structures were to be created or adapted (Ibid.: 208). One of 
the authors, Maggie Black called it Oxfam’s “anti-institutionalism” (Black 1992: 208). 
Despite their views at this level of analysis, NGOs in Ethiopia believed that the imperial 
government was the main development agent to work alongside. This could be seen from the 
perspective of NGOs and the government’s attitude towards the role of NGOs. NGOs appreciated 
the efforts of the government to uplift the lives of the people. Agriculture, which was the chief 
sector of NGO engagement, received a fair share of the government’s funding particularly from 
the late 1960s when, as elsewhere in the world, there was rapid shift towards improving the lives 
of small holder agriculture (Rahmeto 2009: 50). Earlier, the government had focused on 
commercial farming as a means to boost production and increase foreign exports (Ibid.: 50). 
The government, for its part, welcomed initiatives that would add more dimensions to its efforts. 
A typical example of this was that the government recognized urban residents’ initiatives to set 
up NGOs to carry out development activities in their home areas (Rahmeto 2008b: 104). This 
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gained constitutional status. The revised constitution of 1955 recognized the right to form 
economic associations (Clapham 1969: 177). This right to associations was further elaborated five 
years later in the Civil Code of Ethiopia (The Imperial Government of Ethiopia 1960). 
Like any NGO in the country, NGOs selected for this project appreciated the effort already 
underway by the government and considered their own initiatives as complementary to it. For 
instance, a text produced by ASE that assessed the effort of the government describes that efforts 
underway in the country “[…] are necessary, especially for a quick economic take-off”(Agri-
Service Ethiopia 1975: 4). ASE was also motivated and assisted by government officials who 
initiated development efforts at the grassroots in the same area where ASE was operational. One 
of these was the extraordinary initiative which the provincial administration led by Dejjazmatch 
Wolde Semait took to improve the lives of the people. In his memoir, Dejjazmatch Wolde Semait 
states that prior to his arrival in Wollaita in 1963, there had never been any sign of development 
(Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 27). The second initiative was the Wollaita Agricultural 
Development Unit (WADU) in Wollaita province set up in 1968 by the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
Unit stood to provide peasants with easy access to modern inputs such as fertilizers, selected 
seeds etc., to promote better farming techniques and farm implements, to organize peasants into 
cooperatives enabling them to have better access to credit, to expand extension services, to 
improve marketing facilities and prices for peasant produce, and to build rural public works such 
as feeder roads, water projects and environmental protection schemes (Agri-Service Ethiopia 
1975: 27-28). ASE secured a wide range of supports from officials of the two initiatives at the 
grassroots level. Concerning this, one of the protagonists of ASE, Father Henry, remembers that 
the earliest employees of ASE were “[…] backed as we were by local authorities of the 
government” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 24). 
Government officials offered their assistance to ASE because they believed that the educational 
program of ASE was the same as the agricultural extension service of the government. In fact, they 
were quite different. While the agricultural extension program focused more on technical 
application of improved agricultural activities, the education program of ASE was all about the 
creation of well-informed peasant class. ASE itself recognized the difference that existed between 
the two programs. In one of its texts, ASE described of its own position that “the final aim of 
development is not man’s material well-being but man himself. Man must not only have more, he 
must be more” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1975: 2). Assisted by government officials, ASE saw the 
earliest sign of success in its endeavor. This could be explained in terms of the impact it created. 
Concerning the earliest success of the organization, one of the founders of ASE remembers that 
“[…] we could see, as soon as ASE began to walk, that farmers’ steps were backed and their 
ambition enlightened through their becoming more conscious of their own value […] of the real 
value of their own growth and wisdom” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 2000a: 24). This success of ASE 
was publicized to a larger extent. Firstly, other missionaries emulated its initiative. The case in 
point was that a Catholic priest, Reverend Marcel Cannault initiated a similar project in Ashira 
which was located 30 kilometers away from Dobbo where ASE had opened an office in 1967 (Ibid:. 
12). Secondly, even before the official establishment of ASE, the monarch who had heard much 
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about the project visited the project in 1968 and gave moral support to the founders of ASE (Agri-
Service Ethiopia: 2009: 1). 
Like ASE, Oxfam extended its appreciation to the effort underway in the country and assisted the 
initiatives. Oxfam extended its earliest assistance to the government by rescuing victims of famine 
in Gojjam province in 1964 (Personal interview with Mr. Mesfin: 2012, October 10; Teka 
2000:141). Moreover, it financed a resettlement scheme called Angar Gutin Development Project 
in Wollega province in the early 1972 (Solidarité et Développement 1973: 4). Initiated jointly by 
the government and Solidarité et Développement, an NGO from France, this project aimed to 
resettle and improve smallholder farmers through an integrated approach. The government left 
the project to operate with its own autonomy. The project started by distributing land and 
agricultural inputs (Oxen, fertilizers, pesticides, seeds etc.) to 300 tenants and landless peasants 
who immediately brought 160 hectares of land under cultivation (Ibid.: 1). The enthusiasm of 
project participants to improve their status was impressive. In fact, the interest was so high that 
the project had to reject the applications submitted by project participants who came from distant 
places. Commenting on the number of applications submitted on 8 October 1973 alone, the 
organization stated that “[…] this morning, around 60 people applied for a place at the center; they 
came from Wollega, Shoa, and Gojjam provinces. During the past months, applications to join the 
project have risen sharply. Yet there was no announcement that there would be place for new 
candidates” (Ibid.: 1). 
However, farmers who became project participants were able to improve their living conditions. 
An eyewitness who was aware of the living conditions of project participants prior to the 
beginning of the project reported that “compared with their previous situation settlers found their 
income and prospects improved” (van Santen 2010: 23). Moreover, the project strengthened the 
relationship between Oxfam and the Ethiopian government. The government used this cordial 
relationship to appeal to Oxfam to open an office when famine occurred in the country in 1973-
74. The invitation was accepted. In his letter to the Minister of Justice, Brendan Gormley, the Africa 
Director of Oxfam describes that Oxfam opened the first office in Addis “primarily in response to 
a request by the then Government [the imperial government] of Ethiopia for support in 
responding to a severe drought situation and also to assist in addressing the conditions of extreme 
poverty persisting in some parts of the country” (Gormley 1998). 
NGOs not only acted autonomously but also influenced officials of the government. Even before 
they set up their organization, the founders of CCRDA continuously argued with government 
officials for a consorted action to be taken to deal with the famine including making it public. 
Influenced by their pressure, the Minister of Community Development and Social Affairs 
organized a meeting in which the minister for the first time used famine to describe the food crisis 
in the country. Describing the objective of the meeting, one of the founders remembers that it was 
“to press the Ethiopian imperial government to make the famine that claimed many lives public” 
(Beyene 1988: 3). The government consistently supported CCRDA after its establishment. This 
was because CCRDA remained the only broad-based organization to coordinate relief operation 
until later when the military government [1974-1991] strengthened the Relief and Rehabilitation 
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Commission (RRC) which the imperial government had set up in April 1974 (CRDA 1977: 11). One 
of the earliest steps that carried CCRDA forward was that government officials allowed the 
organization to open bank accounts even before it was legally registered (Doheny 1997: 98). 
Moreover, largely due to the continued support of the government, CCRDA together with its 
members was able to control the famine situation a year after its establishment (Christian Relief 
Fund 1974: 5). 
To summarize, NGOs articulated development visions that ultimately originated from the global 
discourses as well as from the food crisis that occurred in Ethiopian in the 1970s. These visions 
(of Oxfam and ASE) or the context in which these visions (of CCRDA) were formulated contained 
potential conflict with the government. Despite their potential conflict, these NGOs pursued their 
visions in a way that appreciated at least the government’s effort to uplift the lives of the poor 
people. The government itself remained benevolent to NGOs, respecting their autonomy. This was 
because the government believed that they would complement its own effort. This cordial relation 
contributed to the earliest success of NGOs in Ethiopia. 
4.2 Instrumentalization of NGOs 
The relative autonomy with which NGOs acted in their visions was seriously questioned during 
the revolution that occurred in 1974. Dergue3 came to power in the midst of the revolution and  
undermined the autonomy that NGOs had enjoyed during the imperial period. This was part of 
the process that narrowed public space. Soon after it took power, Dergue declared Socialism to be 
the only ideology of the state and it started to restructure the economy and society in line with 
socialist principles. It nationalized private property through the Ownership and Control of the 
Means of Production Proclamation put in place in March 1975. The government introduced the 
Rural Land Proclamation that abolished the land tenure system of the imperial regime in April 
1975. In July 1975, the government announced nationalization of urban land including excess 
houses owned by individuals (Clapham 1987: 152). In early 1975, the government deployed high 
school and university students to rural areas to organize society and teach them about the ideals 
of socialism and distribute land to each household (Rahmeto 2009: 140). Though the government 
stated officially that they would have their own autonomy in serving the public, a dense network 
of organizations set up throughout the country remained an implementation arm of the military 
government. When this became clear, the government itself confessed that “[…] those 
organizations set up so far and to be set up in the future would never be politically neutral” 
(Ministry of Agriculture 1980: 32). To make things worse, alternative forms of organizations were 
banned. Any form of organization that the government could not control directly was considered 
as reactionary and they were decimated (Ibid.: 32). Even self-help associations that had a 
functional value to urban residents were considered by the government to be a remnant of the old 
regime. Thus, they were closed down (Rahmeto 2002: 104). 
                                                             
3 A Ge’ez word for council 
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Restructuring the economy and society was carried out with a view to defining the future Ethiopia. 
Politicians in the 1960s and 1970s were driven by the ideals of socialist Ethiopia where there was 
no exploitation of man by man and where the society is self-sufficient in order to withstand 
imperialism. In doing so, this generation of Ethiopian politicians did not intend to negotiate with 
the context in which they were born and grew up. Part of the reason for this was that prominent 
supporters of the imperial regime were still operating against the revolution through an armed 
force called the Ethiopian Democratic Union. As a result, revolutionaries in the government and 
in the opposition not only condemned the imperial regime, but also called for a complete divorce 
from it. Concerning this, the chairman of the military government who addressed an audience 
vowed that “we will liquidate the evil legacies of the past” (Clapham 1987: 155). 
The government did not spare the NGO sector. In fact, the NGO sector was the first victim of the 
revolution. As soon as it came to power, the government decimated NGOs that members of the 
ruling class had set up. These included the Haile Selassie I Foundation. In their reference to the 
issue, scholarly works done so far describe that the military government crippled the NGOs sector 
in the country. This, however, holds partial truth. Many of the NGOs themselves willingly 
submitted to the government. This calls for examining the issue from the perspective of the 
government and NGOs. Prior to that, it is vital to summarize the reactions of NGOs to the new 
government. Four forms of NGOs reaction were evident. The first group of NGOs withdrew from 
the country in the earliest time. These were faith-based NGOs that had operated during the 
imperial period. They found out that it is difficult to operate in the country where freedom of 
religion is suppressed by the government (Rahmeto et al 1990: 15). The second group of NGOs 
included a few international NGOs namely Médecins Sans Frontières from France that openly 
condemned the government’s abuse of power (Dodd 1985: 130). The third group of NGOs 
included national NGOs who became surrogates of the government. The last group of NGOs was 
those that represented the majority of international NGOs that acted covertly against the attempt 
of the government to build a strong socialist state. Despite their covert resistance that in no way 
had any effect, they openly lend themselves to be instrumentalized by the regime (Campbell 1996: 
13).The first two groups of NGOs left the country due to their own positions and our discussion 
now focuses on the interactions between the last two groups of NGOs and the military 
government.  
The ideological foundation of the military government did not allow the existence of organizations 
that could articulate alternative development models. However, the military government 
tolerated NGOs out of necessity. The government fought bloody wars against various armed 
groups in the North and the Somali invading forces. All these drained the state treasury (Ibid.: 13). 
Moreover, due to its poor human rights records and ideological differences, the government was 
unable to secure aid from Western governments. Government officials associated every problem 
the country faced with major Western powers’ refusal to support Ethiopia. For instance, in the 
context of the famine of 1983–1984, a politburo of the government made a conference speech in 
which he blamed Western donors for having failed to provide Ethiopia with the financial support 
to pre-empt the famine. He said that: 
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It is because the necessary funds have not been available for development efforts and 
for an increase in food production in the traditional drought-prone areas of the 
country that we are now witnessing the current tragedy of death and starvation and 
are unable, from own resources, either to prevent famine or to mitigate its effect 
(Kolemen 1985: 9). 
As a result, NGOs were considered to attract the foreign currency the country needed (Campbell 
1996: 13). 
Although it tolerated NGOs, the government did not have the intention to allow them autonomy 
in their visions of development. Two major factors explain this. The first one was ideological. The 
government believed that NGOs were purveyors of western values which, it believed, had to be 
curtailed (Wolde Giorgis 1988: 155). Secondly, the government did not have the resources to 
deliver services to the people. As a result, the government was forced to allow NGOs to bring in 
foreign currency. On the other hand, the government did not want the people to know that the 
government failed to deliver services. The result of this was that the government put NGOs under 
strict supervision of governmental organizations. An evaluation done in 1990 showed that the 
“[…] working environment in Ethiopia has enforced NGOs into close relationship with government 
organizations with the result that donors [NGOs] are viewed by peasants as part of the 
implementation arms of the government” (Rahmeto et al 1990: 15). Thus, the government went 
to great lengths to drive NGOs according to its own policies. However, I argue that many of the 
NGOs in Ethiopia lent themselves to be instruments of the military government much more than 
the government’s influences. 
Like many ordinary citizens, the leaders of ASE, influenced by INADES-Formation that was one of 
its donors, welcomed a set of measures that the military government introduced especially rural 
land redistribution. They appreciated also the intention of the government to make education for 
all including the peasants. In that context, ASE did not intend to take seriously any difference 
between its own rural education program and that of the government. A note circulated by the 
middle of 1970s when ASE sought to work alongside the Ministry of Agriculture clearly shows 
that ASE did not intend to take seriously the difference between its program and that of the 
government. Part of the note written in Amharic reads: 
“ድርጅቱ ለገጠሩ የሚሰጠው ትምህርት እርሻ ሚኒስቴር ከሚሰጠው አገልግሎት የአሰራሩ ዘዴ የተለየ ቢሆንም 
አላማው ተመሳሳይ ስለሆነ የበለጠ ሊያበረክት የሚቺለው ከግብርና ሚኒስቴር ጎንለ ጎን ለመስራት ሲቺል ነው ብሎ 
INADES-Formation ስላመነበት ድርጅቱ ለጊዚው በእርሻ ሚኒስቴር ሆኖ የሚሰራበት ስምምነት እንዲደረግ 
እ.ኤ.አ. በሃምሌ ወር 1975 አ.ም ጥያቄ በደብዳቤ አቀረበ” 
This roughly means that “[…] though there is a difference on the method, INADES-Formation 
submitted a draft agreement in July 1975 based on which ASE would operate alongside the 
Ministry of Agriculture for their aim is the same” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1980: 1). 
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ASE developed pro-government attitude partly due to its own internal weakness to cope with the 
rapidly changing rural context. The organization, that had operated in a relatively stable rural 
setting, was overwhelmed by the profound changes. As a result, it lacked the authority to mobilize 
the populace and it felt that it had lost its organizational relevance. In order to have the authority, 
ASE argued for an integration of its educational program into that of the Ministry of Agriculture 
that was a leading actor for mass mobilization (Ibid.: 7). The organization argued that the decision 
to operate along official lines is justified. In one of its texts, ASE stressed that “[…] any organization 
with an essentially educative nature such as ASE is necessarily concerned by the major socio-
political events which are in the process of transforming” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1989: 9). In fact, 
it was not reformulating the visions which ASE had embraced by considering changes taking place 
in the country. It was rather a deliberate attempt by the organization to win official support. A text 
printed in the midst of the revolution is indicative of this. It says that “[…] legally, it [ASE] has so 
far been a private organization; in practice it has been semi-governmental” (Agri-Service Ethiopia 
1975: 6). 
The Ministry of Agriculture, whose resources had been depleted because of the profound rural 
reorganization, welcomed ASE’s plan for integration. This was because the Ministry saw huge 
resources under the command of ASE. A memo circulated by the Ministry attests to this. Part of it 
reads:  
Its [ASE’s] programmes, the production of teaching materials and aids, its rural radio 
forums and farmers’ newsletters are invaluable for the dissemination of ideals and 
methods. Even its programme of training farmers though on a limited scale has 
provided an opportunity for ASE to gain practical experience with the needs and 
conditions of farmers in rural Ethiopia. The facilities and experience that ASE has 
created over many years in Ethiopia could complement the efforts of the Ministry of 
Agriculture that has already created an extension network covering most parts of the 
country (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1982: 6). 
The pro-government attitude of ASE was not an exception. It was rather the rule that national 
NGOs pursued. National NGOs not only appreciated sets of measures that they considered to be 
progressive and pro-poor, but also financed even the most controversial projects of the 
government. The financial structures were in favor of NGOs. Major donors withdrew from 
Ethiopia due to human right violations and ideological differences. These donors who were now 
far away from Ethiopia sought to reach out  to the poor through NGOs; they sent money to NGOs 
who used it without any significant follow up from donors. Moreover, NGOs solicited finances 
from a variety of individuals and organizations that sought to see only reports. CCRDA was one of 
these NGOs that financed controversial projects of the government with funds raised from foreign 
donors. The military government reinvigorated the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) 
that the imperial government had set up. This created a situation where CCRDA became no longer 
the only coordinator of the voluntary sector. CCRDA believed that both organizations stood for 
ensuring food security in the country. Thus, the organization felt the importance of assisting RRC. 
In its 1976 report, CCRDA described that “it [CCRDA] seeks to assist the government by sharing 
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the common problems concerning the welfare and development of the Ethiopian people” (CRDA 
1977: 2). The risk was that RRC was not politically neutral. It was one of the main institutions to 
involve in politically and ideologically driven projects such as resettlement scheme throughout 
the 1980s. CCRDA stood firm with the government even by the time the government was sharply 
criticized by the international community. The government officials stated that the best strategy 
to ensure food security is to relocate people from famine prone areas to excess producing regions. 
A text addressed to Oxfam by RRC summed up this official justification of the government. It states 
that “[…] the settlement programme is and will continue to be a viable development scheme and 
designed and carried out by our government to improve the lot of our people and thereby 
extricate them from dependency” (RRC 1988a: 1). 
When the majority of the people relocated in the 1980s and the way this resettlement was 
implemented are considered, the argument of the government was not persuasive. It was the 
imperial government that had introduced resettlement to ensure sustainable livelihood of poor 
people in Ethiopia. Resettlement was for the first time considered seriously during the Third Five 
Years Plan (1968-1973) of the imperial government. The plan stated that: 
A gradual but accelerating shift in agricultural population will begin to be seen during 
the Third Plan from the present crowded Northern and Central highlands to the 
lowland areas and in a still longer run to the southwestern highlands and those parts 
of the southern highlands where population was not a problem (Bekelle 1988: 130). 
Resettlement during the military period differed from that of the imperial government in two 
important respects. Firstly, resettlement during the military period was carried out by coercion. 
The government continuously argued that the scheme was being carried out voluntarily (RRC 
1988b: 1). However, sources closer to the issue prove that this was not the case. The governor of 
Wollo from which the people were resettled in large number told officials of Oxfam and Save the 
Children Fund that “[…] given the natural attachment of people to their homes resettlement could 
not succeed as a voluntary activity” (RRC 1988c: 1). Secondly, the military government increased 
the magnitude of the program. From its inception in the early 1960 to 1974, the imperial 
government resettled only 20, 000 people in different parts of the country. With the creation of 
the Settlement Authority in 1976, the military government resettled 30, 298 people from 1976 to 
1979 (Bekelle 1988: 128). In the context of the Ethiopian famine that occurred again in 1983-84, 
the president himself ordered the resettlement of 1 million people most of which to be from Wollo 
and Tigray. These two provinces were obviously hit by the famine much more than any other 
region in the country. However, famine was not the only factor. The two provinces remained areas 
where armed rebels mainly the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) was operating. The 
government thus wanted to drain the social basis of rebels by relocating the people from these 
regions. Thus, it was part of the counter-insurgency strategy of the government (Goyder 1983: 1). 
NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières questioned the government’s use of force to resettle the 
people (Dodd: 1985: 130). However, the majority of NGOs including their coordination body, 
CCRDA, turned down the outcry of Médecins Sans Frontières (Ibid.: 30). In a position statement 
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that it circulated to its members, CCRDA condemned Médecins Sans Frontières for criticizing the 
government’s policy that, it said, was sensible. Part of it reads “CRDA’s [CCRDA’s] position is that 
it does, through its members, support the general policy of resettlement as this is a defensible 
policy in the light of chronic drought conditions of northern Ethiopia” (CRDA: 1985: 1). CCRDA 
undermined also the accusation of Médecins Sans Frontières that the government violated gross 
human rights in the name of resettlement. Concerning this the same statement quoted above 
states further that “CRDA [CCRDA] members would point out that it is impossible to prove or 
disprove their allegations, as many might have died of starvations or related diseases if they have 
stayed either in their own villages or in the relief camps” (Ibid.: 1). 
Two factors drove CCRDA to act along the official line. Firstly, the euphoria that the land reform 
generated led CCRDA to take the government as a partner. The leadership of CCRDA appreciated 
the land reform that, it believed, would lay down the ground for “community based development”. 
This was because the land reform assured every adult a piece of land to sustain his/her livelihood. 
Partly motivated by this, the CCRDA shifted its priority to long term development activities. In 
order to reflect the priority, the organization abandoned its ad hoc name, Christian Relief Fund to 
Christian Relief and Development Association on 17 March 1975, signifying the influence of the 
radical land reform that had been announced on 4 March 1975 (CRDA 1977: 14). Secondly, 
internal factors nurtured a pro-government attitude among CCRDA’s leadership. CCRDA pursued 
a cautious approach to its own members; it lacked sufficient authority to influence its own 
members due to sensitive theological differences. After the famine relief operation diminished in 
1974/75, CCRDA asked its members to submit an annual plan in connection to rehabilitation 
activities. Many of its members believed that they did not have to submit their plan. CCRDA 
considered it as lack of harmony within its membership. CCRDA told its members with regret that 
the “CRF [precursor of CCRDA] does not speak with a corporate voice on behalf of its members” 
(Christian Relief Fund 1974: 5). Realizing its limitation, CCRDA told the RRC that “…each of our 
constituent members should be approached for information individually by the Commission 
[RRC]” (Ibid.: 1). 
In acting along the official line, CCRDA claims to have “represented” the interests of members 
many of which were international NGOs. However, there were differences between the leadership 
of CCRDA and international NGO representatives with regard to the government’s policy. While 
CCRDA fully supported the government’s policy, international NGOs led by Médecins Sans 
Frontières were opposed to it. Two major issues framed the international NGOs’ actions. Firstly, 
their close contacts with the rural communities brought them face to face with the effects of 
politically and ideologically driven resettlement, villagization, forced mobilization, restrictive 
marketing policies, exploitative taxation, forced conscription and an abusive authoritarian rule 
and so on (Rahmeto 1990: 52). The second issue was that the two major famines that occurred in 
1974-75 and 1983-84 publicized Ethiopia to a larger extent. As a result, NGOs were able to 
mobilize huge resources from foreign donors (Ibid.: 44). The two factors put international NGOs 
at a clear dilemma. On the one hand, their own visions informed them to resist the government’s 
actions that underdeveloped the general public and violated their rights. This was true partly 
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because they embraced a new strategic direction that intended to empower the people to 
suppress any form of repression. On the other hand, international NGOs were concerned that an 
attempt to resist the government policy would result in their expulsions and thus loss of the 
lucrative setting. This was particularly true after the expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from 
Ethiopia in 1985 for resisting the resettlement that created huge social crisis in the country (Dodd 
1985:130). In the context of that dilemma, NGOs acted in the framework of the government’s 
policies. The way Oxfam acted shows that in the context of the dilemma described earlier, 
international NGOs succumbed to the government and lend themselves to be its subservient. 
While revolution was in the making in Ethiopia, Oxfam in Oxford strategized itself, driven by the 
teaching of Paulo Freire. Influenced by his concept of conscientization, Oxfam repositioned itself 
in 1975 in a way that emphasized the power of people. The new sense of purpose and strategic 
direction is summed up in one of its documents. It states that: 
Oxfam believes in the essential dignity of people and in their capacity to overcome the 
problems and pressures which can crush and exploit them. Oxfam is a partnership of 
people who share these beliefs-people who, regardless of race, sex, religion or politics 
work together for the basic rights of food, shelter and reasonable condition of life 
(Oxfam in Jennings 2008: 121). 
However, the military government stifled all self-help spirit in Ethiopia. Contrary to the essence 
of Oxfam’s strategic direction, the revolutionary government ensured its totalitarian rule 
throughout the country. Oxfam knew very well that the space in which it could act to help the 
people did not exist. Frustrated by the situation, Stephen LIod, Deputy Country Representative of 
Oxfam in Ethiopia, reported that “[…] it is very difficult to find ways of working here which are not 
top down. The heavily directive nature of official intervention leaves little room to develop a 
particular milieu” (LIoyd 1987: 1). 
On the one hand, the restricted environment created uncertainty about whether Oxfam would  
continue to exist in Ethiopia or not (Goyder 1983: 2). However, the Ethiopian famines of 1973-
1974 and 1983-1984 generated a great deal of public generosity around the world. This created 
a situation where NGOs were able to mobilize huge resources. For instance, as a result of the 
Ethiopian famine of the 1980s Oxfam was able to generate £ 51.1 million, up from less than £ 20 
million in 1983-84 (Hancock 1994: 4). Under this circumstance, it was unthinkable for the 
organization to leave Ethiopia. It could even be argued that the resources further drove Oxfam to 
act along official lines. In fact, an agreement was lacking within Oxfam on the extent to which the 
organization had to work with the government. Officials of Oxfam in Ethiopia who experienced 
the restrictive political environment submitted to the government. Many of the correspondences 
that the field director of Oxfam in Ethiopia addressed to the headquarters in Oxford attest to his 
apology. In 1982, the field director addressed a report to Oxfam in which he discussed the causes 
of food insecurity in the country. In his report, he pointed out that food insecurity was caused by 
inappropriate policy of the government. Part of his report says that “[…] production of all crops 
has been affected by the poor performance of the state farms and the lack of incentives to 
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producers to sell on the official market” (Goyder 1982). Let alone to argue with the government 
against these policies that deepened poverty, the field director advised the headquarters to go 
along with the official narrative. In the same report quoted here, the director said that “[…] it is 
convenient to give drought as the cause of these problems” (Ibid.). This was exactly what the 
government argued for. The government argued that drought was the ultimate factor for food 
insecurity in the country (Wolde Giorgis 1988: 155). The field director acted in line with the 
guidelines he was given by the headquarters in Oxford. However, officials at the headquarters 
were opposed to the extent to which the field director went to back up the government. In a book 
he published recently, one of the officials of Oxfam, Tony Vaux, said that “[…] in the early 1980s, 
Oxfam […] became alarmed that its own representative was acting as an apologist for the 
government” (Vaux 2001: 49). 
To summarize, NGO visions were seriously undermined not only by the state that ensured its 
hegemony in the name of socialism but also by pragmatism within NGOs themselves. 
4.3 A New Order, a Quest for New Visions and State Action 
In Ethiopia, as is true also in most African countries, NGOs of various types relied on donors such 
as the World Bank, the Department for International Development (DFID), Christian Aid, the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Netherlands Organization for 
International Development Cooperation (NOVIB), Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED), 
INADES-Formation etc. Though they did supply assistance, these donors did not necessarily 
intend to influence the state to assure space for NGOs operation. This was true in the context of 
the Cold War and it contributed to the submission of NGOs in Ethiopia to the military 
government’s policies. This was because Western Governments put aside any policy that could 
antagonize countries that embraced Socialism in the Third World. This gave African leaders the 
chance to use that power for their own purpose regardless of the opinion of their own people 
(Ibid.: 52). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the context changed with the collapse of the socialist camp. The 
Ethiopian government that had remained dependent on the socialist camp could no longer get any 
form of assistance and as a compromise, it announced in March 1990 the “New Economic Policy” 
that promised liberalization of the economy. Soon, the rural people demolished rural 
governmental institutions with a great sense of relief (Rahmeto 1990: 10). In May 1991, the 
government fell and a new transitional government was set up by ex-rebels/Marxists who 
convinced donors that they had accepted neo-liberalism. The government introduced a 
transitional charter that promised the creation of a democratic Ethiopia where freedom of person 
and equality are assured (The Transitional Government of Ethiopia 1991: 49). The new 
constitution approved in 1995 that replaced the transitional charter confirmed these ideals and 
aspired for the creation of a political community, capable of building a democratic order on the 
basis of the rule of law. NGOs were considered to have a role in the process (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 1995: 1). 
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Soon after they took state power, officials of the new government promised that NGOs would ran 
their affairs freely anywhere in the country (Vaux 1991: 3). In what could be described as a 
positive development, the government tried to drive NGOs to adopt a long term perspective by 
inducing them to abandon their relief orientation (Agri-Service Ethiopia 1995: 12). To that end, 
the government introduced a set of legislations including a ban on importation of food from 
abroad (CRDA 1995). Moreover, in order to stifle free distribution of food, the government 
introduced a new national policy on disaster prevention, preparedness and response that called 
for the integration of food aid with development works (CRDA 1996: 3; Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Commission 1993: 5). 
In order to implement the national policy and as part of its decentralization program, the 
government decentralized the RRC (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission 1993: 5). 
The measures came to be a big blow for associations such as CCRDA that “represented” a 
substantial number of individual NGOs. As a response, the leaders of CCRDA resigned one after 
the other. This put the association at a critical condition. On this issue, the chairman of the 
association stated that “it is critical to ensure that the integrity of CRDA [CCRDA] is kept 
[maintained] during this time when we are facing big challenges and are in a difficult moment” 
(CRDA 1995). In order to adjust itself, CCRDA went through a strategic planning exercise and 
embraced a broader vision from 1997 on; it aspired for a poverty-free Ethiopia (CRDA 2008: 13). 
CCRDA’s quest for poverty alleviation had earlier been advocated by donors such as NOVIB and 
EED. On the eve of the collapse of the military government, representatives of NOVIB and EED met 
the Executive Committee of the CCRDA “to find the vision which CRDA [CCRDA] has for the future” 
(CRDA 1990). These representatives told the Committee also that “[…] sustainable development 
by local NGOs is their priority” (Ibid.). Thus, in order to carry forward its vision, CCRDA adopted 
capacity building for members and creating an enabling environment as its key strategic 
directions (Ibid.). 
The agenda for poverty alleviation was pursued by other NGOs as well. ASE, like CCRDA, aspired 
for a poverty-free Ethiopia due to the revival of donors’ interest. Certainly, this revival had to do 
with the collapse of the military government. Few months after the regime change in May 1991, 
the Africa Desk officer of NOVIB, told the acting executive director of ASE that “Novib’s policy with 
regard to Ethiopia was based on the reality of the wars” (Couwenbergh 1991: 2). Thus, NOVIB 
increased its commitment in Ethiopia since the fall of the military government. This, again, was 
part of an increased interest that NOVIB pursued at the international level. As part of a 
development discourse that followed the end of the Cold War, NGOs were encouraged to bring 
issues to major international forums. In one of the forums organized by the United Nations 
Organizations, NOVIB argued that the end of the Cold War would give way to market led economic 
systems and the market would never address poverty and hunger. NOVIB concluded that global 
efforts should be geared towards poverty alleviation and equality of gender (NOVIB 1993: 1; 
NOVIB 1995: 1). Prior to that, NOVIB had consulted its partners in different parts of the Third 
World including ASE about poverty alleviation and gender equality. In a letter he addressed to 
NOVIB, the Executive Director stated that he fully agreed with the poverty alleviation agenda 
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(Worku 1996: 1). Consequently, ASE came up with a broader vision in 1996 that stated that ASE 
would aspire to see a happy/desirable rural Ethiopia, achievable by eradicating poverty (Agri-
Service Ethiopia 2000b: 45). 
Like many NGOs in the country such as CCRDA and ASE, Oxfam felt the influences of changes 
taking place in and out of Ethiopia. Soon after the “New Economic Policy” of the military 
government was announced in March 1990, a group of reviewers employed by the headquarters 
advised that Oxfam was to revitalize its commitment on poverty alleviation and “empowerment” 
of the people (Rahmeto 1990: 57). Motivated by the end of the Cold War, the headquarters of 
Oxfam conducted a strategic review and affirmed that Oxfam envisioned the alleviation of poverty 
in any part of the world through two strategic directions namely prevention of conflict and 
building sustainable livelihoods (Oxfam 2003: 1). 
Although it was driving NGOs to embrace a broader vision, the new government was against their 
tendency towards “the rights-based approach to development” that gained global acceptance 
(Horn Consult 2003: 4). The new government showed clear antipathy towards NGOs. Its antipathy 
and the justification for this are shown in one of the ruling party’s organ issued in 1993. It states 
that: 
We should not try to bring in outsiders to lead the peasants. In the rural areas, there 
are an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental development 
workers. These lower level members of the intelligentsia can undermine our 
influence and development programme if they oppose our political line (Addis Raey 
in Markakis 2011: 253). 
The government’s antipathy towards NGOs had to do not only with the fact that NGOs subscribed 
to the rights-based approach to development but also with what NGOs had done in the early 
1980s. In the early 1980s, major Western NGOs were involved in the “Cross Border Operation”, 
whereby relief assistance reached rebel-held territories in Tigray through the Sudan. They helped 
to relieve the people through the active participation of the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the 
humanitarian wing of the TPLF. NGO participation in the “Cross Border Operation” violated 
international and national laws. Officials of the TPLF who were now in power were concerned 
that international NGOs might get involved in similar activities that would undermine the 
government. As a result, the government was anxious to strictly control NGOs, and to make use of 
the flow of aid funds themselves, rather than share it with independent NGOs (Markakis 2011: 
253). 
The antagonism of the government led to an “indigenization” of NGOs that refers to the process 
whereby expatriate employees of NGOs at the leadership positions were replaced by Ethiopians. 
Indigenizing NGOs goes as far back as their early existence in Ethiopia. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
expatriates were heavily represented in the leadership positions of NGOs. NGO leaders noted that 
this did not go along with their visions. This led them to varying degrees of indigenization. 
Differences did exist between NGOs with regard to the degree and pace of indigenization. ASE, for 
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instance, went through the earliest rapid and complete indigenization process. Replacing 
foreigners in the leadership positions started as soon as ASE started operation in 1969. However, 
it was only in 1977 that all leadership positions of ASE were taken over by Ethiopians (Personal 
interview with Mr. Worku: 2013, September 3). While it was achieved relatively easily in the case 
of ASE, indigenization was influenced by the origins of a number of other NGOs in Ethiopia. 
Although Ethiopians played an important role in the establishment of CCRDA, expatriates were 
for a long period much more visible in the leadership of CCRDA. This was because the executive 
committee was elected from the members of CCRDA, and foreign NGOs were predominant in 
Ethiopia. This remained a major concern of key personalities who played an active part in the 
establishment of CCRDA. Father Kevin Doheny was one of those personalities who worked hard 
to bring Ethiopians to leadership positions of CCRDA. This changed the situation towards the end 
of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Ethiopians filled in important positions in the executive 
committee and they became extremely assertive in their relation with expatriates. This could be 
seen from the debate that followed the decision of CCRDA to get involved in the relief operation 
in 1984–1985. Ethiopians, spearheaded by the chairman Asrat Gebre, argued that as an Ethiopian 
organization CCRDA had a direct responsibility to relieve Ethiopians stricken by the famine. 
Representatives of some 20 foreign NGOs argued that CCRDA’s mandate should be limited to 
coordinating the work of its member organizations. In the context of this heated debate, the 
chairman reminded expatriates that they were in Ethiopia just to assist, and warned them not to 
argue further. He told them that: 
Since this is [our] home, most of you have come to help, and since many of you are 
new to Ethiopia, we will not disappoint you with a schism. I hope this way of doing 
business is not repeated again simply because the thread that holds us together is 
very thin and weak (Gebre 1985: 3). 
The outbreak of the famine itself resulted in the establishment of national NGOs. These NGOs 
became members of CCRDA and their representatives occupied positions in the executive 
committee, the general assembly as well as in the secretariat. However, the position of the 
executive director that symbolized CCRDA was still held by an expatriate. The indigenizing of 
CCRDA was completed after a further regime change in 1991. The new government developed a 
policy of reducing foreign influences. In response, Brother Augustus O’Keeffee, a French 
expatriate who had served CCRDA as executive director for 20 years, resigned in 1995 (CRDA 
1995). A committee set up to recruit a candidate stipulated that his incoming replacement, the 
British expatriate John Roberts, was to hand his post on to an Ethiopian. John Roberts agreed that 
he would train an Ethiopian as his successor. However, this did not work out because the 
government refused to grant a work permit to John Roberts. It was under this circumstance that 
CCRDA came to have its first Ethiopian executive director, Kebedde Asrat, and with this it was 
fully Ethiopianized (CRDA 1997a). The policy that the government pursued to reduce foreign 
influences influenced international NGOs as well, which also went through some degree of 
indigenization in response. One of these was Oxfam, which recruited Ethiopian managers as well 
as Ethiopian employees. However, a report published in 1990 stated that, “[…] there is too big a 
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gap in experience and qualifications between the expatriates at management level and the 
Ethiopian staff” (Rahmeto et al 1990: 51). As in other parts of the world, Oxfam’s office in Ethiopia 
came to have some degree of autonomy. This followed the regionalization process that started in 
the mid-1990s. As a result, Ethiopians started holding key leadership positions. For the first time 
in its history, Oxfam came to have the first Ethiopian resident representative, Gezahegn Kebede, 
who served Oxfam as Country Director from 1998 to 2003 (Personal interview with Mr. Terefe: 
2013, October 10) 
Indigenization granted NGOs marked confidence in dealing with the government. Ethiopians who 
now assumed important positions used to refer to the Ethiopian constitution approved in 1995 
as a guarantee for free operation. Article 31 of this constitution states that as long as it was within 
the legal frameworks of the country, “every person has the right to freedom of association for any 
cause or purpose” (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995: 10). 
However, the right to freedom of association enshrined in the constitution (Ibid.: 10) was not 
exercised easily. The government took a series of administrative and legal measures to force NGOs 
abandon a rights-based approach to development. The Ethiopian Human Right Council, the 
Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association, Plan International etc. were some of the NGOs that 
suffered from repressions of the government (Ministry of Justice 2004: 5). Yet, these measures do 
seem to have failed to achieve their objectives. Conversely, NGOs became more assertive in 
pursuing the rights-based approach to development. In a circumstance where the government 
took measures mentioned above, CCRDA and Oxfam sponsored a study that asserted, “[…] the 
rights-based approach had become the main development agenda in order to increase people’s 
claim for their basic and human rights”(Horn Consult 2003: 4). 
In order to have their voices heard by the government, NGOs formed a network that was used to 
voice the collective opinion of the sector. The NGOs saw, however, that their efforts alone would 
not bring about the desired change. From 1997 on, they approached what later came to be known 
as Donors Assistance Groups (DAGs). DAGs, which started out as a forum for information sharing 
among bilateral and multilateral organizations in Ethiopia, have later come to consider 
themselves as a “community” with a collective voice, and as a partner with, respectively, the 
Ethiopian government, NGOs and the private sector (Rahmeto et al 2008b: 19). The negotiations 
that took place between the Ethiopian governments on the one hand and NGOs and DAGs on the 
other hand resulted in a visible change with regard to the operational environment of NGOs. In 
line with the agreement reached between NGOs, donors and the government on 23 July 1998, the 
government shortened the lengthy bureaucracy of NGOs (Oxfam 1998: 3). This was followed by 
what was called the civil service reform program of the government. As part of this measure, the 
Ministry of Justice that used to register NGOs introduced two measures. Firstly, NGOs did not have 
to submit project proposals before they were officially licensed (Ministry of Justice 2002a: 1-2). 
Secondly, checking the backgrounds of international NGOs by Ethiopian missions abroad was no 
longer a requirement (Ibid.: 2). 
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The reform on NGO registration went hand in hand with negotiations between the Ethiopian 
government, the World Bank and IMF. The negotiations were on how NGOs could play a role in 
good governance; human rights, democracy and peace in the country, all the same fields of action 
that the government planned to work in (Rahmeto et al 2008b: 19). The preparation in 2002 of a 
Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) and of a document on decentralization of power to the 
district level set the context in which the role of NGOs was discussed. The final PRSP promised 
that NGOs could advocate on political issues. Similarly, the decentralization document assured 
NGOs to manage projects and have influence on officials at the local level (Ibid.: 102-105). 
Likewise, the Plan for Accelerated Development to End Poverty (PADEP), which was prepared 
jointly by NGOs and the government and ratified in June 2002, recognized the role NGOs could 
play in governance, namely human rights, democracy, and peace building. Various documents 
published after the PADEP also recognized that NGOs could work on governance. Alongside 
contributing to preparing the PADEP, NGOs argued that the Ministry of Justice should set a new 
legal framework for NGOs in Ethiopia. A series of draft proclamations prepared by the Ministry of 
Justice described how NGOs could work on governance issues. For instance, the preamble of the 
third draft described that:  
ድርጅቶቹ በተለያዩ መስኮች የህብረተሰቡን ግንዛቤ ለማሳደግ ፣በዲሞክራሲ ስርአት ግንባታ ፣ በሰብአዊ መብት ረገድ 
ያሚያደርጉትን አስተዋጽዖ ማጎልበትና የሚያንቀሳቅሱት ከፍተኛ ሃብትም በአግባቡ የታለመለት አላማ መዋሉን 
ማረጋገጥ አስፈላጊ በመሆኑ...በኢትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፕብሊክ ህገ-መንግስት አንቅስ 55 /1/ መሰረት 
የሚከተለው ታውጇል”. 
Its translation is that “Intending to promote the organizations’ [NGOs] role in raising awareness 
of the people, building democracy, and in human rights and to ensure that the huge resources they 
mobilize are spent for the intended purpose, the following is proclaimed as per Number 55 (1) of 
the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” (Ministry of Justice 2002b: 1). 
The support NGOs received from donors and the goodwill shown by the government led NGOs to 
carry out a strategic shift and embrace political visions. CCRDA in 2003 conducted controversial 
debates within itself and envisioned not only a poverty-free Ethiopia but also an Ethiopia where 
the people are empowered to handle their own affairs (CRDA 2008: 16). Similarly, Oxfam came 
up with a conclusion that governance is a key strategic issue to create a poverty-free Ethiopia and 
aspired to see “Empowered citizens enjoying fundamental and democratic rights from an 
accountable government” (Oxfam 2008: 17). The same way, ASE argued that the people are to be 
empowered to make poverty eradication sustainable (Assefa 2006: 7). 
Through their visions, the majority of NGOs went to the communities and taught citizens about 
their rights and monitored the 2005 national and regional elections. Concerned deeply by the new 
sense of NGO purpose, the government aimed to incapacitate them. In the post-election period, 
the government came up with the Ethiopian Charity and Society Act, which was approved in 2009. 
The law defines Ethiopian Residents Charity or Society as any organization that receives more 
than 10% of its funding from foreign sources, and then bars all such Civil Society Organizations 
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(CSOs) from working on human rights and governance issues (Rahmeto et al 2008b: 104). This 
was a heavy blow for the flourishing civil society sector in the country (Ibid.: 104).  
To sum up, NGOs through the encouragement of outside donors envisioned not only the 
eradication of poverty through the empowerment of the people but also an Ethiopia where the 
human and democratic rights of citizens are respected. The government was against this and it in 
effect incapacitated NGOs in the country through a legislation put in place in 2009. 
5 Conclusion 
This case study from Ethiopia has shown that NGO visions are mediated by changing contexts in 
which actors with diverse interests operated. They were mediated not only by dominant actors 
but also by the NGOs themselves. While dominant actors such as the state negotiated NGOs visions 
of development driven by political and/or ideological factors, NGOs negotiated their own visions 
informed by practical issues (pragmatism). NGO leaderships are fully aware that action with a 
view to moving forward their visions is contingent on the context. In a context where the state 
developed its capability to control the public lives, NGO leadership succumbed to the state to 
ensure their organizational existence. In a situation where the state power is constrained namely 
through the interference of donors, they pursued their own visions. Thus, pragmatism is one of 
the factors that negotiated NGOs future orientations. It could thus, be theorized that NGOs are 
likely to become surrogates in the face of unrestrained state. In a situation where NGOs are one of 
the actors in not only articulating but also compromising their visions, it is better to conceptualize 
NGOs development visions as an ending dialogue between pragmatism and idealism. 
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